A variant of Reiter's default logic is proposed as a logic for reasoning with (defeasible) observations. Traditionally, default rules are assumed to represent generic information and the facts are assumed to represent speci c information about the situation, but in this paper, the speci c information derives from defeasible observations represented by (normal free) default rules, and the facts represent (hard) background knowledge. Whenever the evidence underlying some observation is more re ned than the evidence underlying another observation, this is modelled by means of a priority between the default rules representing the observations. We thus arrive at an interpretation of prioritized normal free default logic as an observation logic, and we propose a semantics for this observation logic. Finally, we discuss how the proposed observation logic relates to the multiple extension problem and the problem of sensor fusion.
Introduction
In this paper we propose a variant of Reiter's default logic 8] as a logic for reasoning with (defeasible) observations. A default theory consists of a set of facts and a set of default rules. Traditionally, default rules are assumed to represent general, or generic, information, such as`typically, birds y' and the facts are assumed to represent speci c information about the situation, such as`Tweety is a bird'. However, in this paper we consider the case where the speci c information derives from defeasible observations, and the general information denotes (hard) background knowledge. These
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The nonmonotonic logic proposed in this paper is motivated by the logic of vision proposed in 5], where perception reports are interpreted in inverse systems of rstorder models approximating reality. A perception of is modelled as the truth of given some approximation plus a defeasible expectation that will also be true in more re ned approximations. Perceptions based on more re ned evidence can defeat this expectation.
We abstract from the particular language of 5] and propose prioritized normal free default logic for reasoning with defeasible observations. Each observation is modelled by a normal free default rule, i.e., a default rule which has a single justi cation equivalent to its consequent and a tautology as prerequisite. To take account of the fact that an observation can be defeated by another observation based on more re ned evidence, we add a preference order on the default rules.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In sections 2 and 3, we brie y review some basic properties of default logic, and in particular of the special case where default rules are normal and free. In section 4, we describe how normal free default logic with priorities between default rules can be interpreted as a logic for defeasible observations. A semantics for this observation logic is then presented in section 5. Finally, we discuss how the proposed observation logic relates to the multiple extension problem and the problem of sensor fusion.
Default Logic
We repeat some de nitions and results (without proof) from 8]. Let L be some ordinary rst-order language, and let T h denote an ordinary rst-order consequence operation for that language. (The dependence on L and T h of the de nitions and results below will mostly remain implicit.) Formulas of L are denoted by ; ; : : :. In examples, propositional letters p; q; : : : are used, which are supposed to be included in the language.
De nition 1 A default rule is an expression of the form: De nition 3 An extension of the closed default theory hD; ?i is a xed point of the function f : 2 L ! 2 L given by: f( ) is the smallest set such that D1 ? 2 f( ) D2 T h(f( )) = f( ) D3 If : 1 ; : : : ; n =! 2 D, 2 f( ) and for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, : i 6 2 , then ! 2 f( ). An extension of a default theory hD; ?i is intended to represent a reasonable state of belief based on the default rules in D and facts in ?. Below, we give a more informal characterization of default extensions, which is essentially a reformulation of the semantics for default logic given in 3] Let be a logically closed set of sentences of L. The default rule : 
Free Default Logic
In this section, we consider a fragment of default logic in which the prerequisite of a default rule is assumed to be a tautology. Such a rule is called (prerequisite-)free.
De nition 5 A default rule is called free i its prerequisite is a tautology (in rstorder logic). A default theory is called free i all its default rules are free.
Free default theories have been studied in 1, 9, 10]. (In 1] the free default rules are also assumed to be normal, which is the case we are especially interested in.) In 9, 10] it is argued that rational agents adhering to Savage's`sure-thing principle' should be willing to replace arbitrary default rules by free default rules. In general, the resulting default theory will not be equivalent to the original one. However, it is not hard to show that any default theory is equivalent to a free default theory.
An advantage of free default logic is that it allows reasoning by cases. Another interesting property of normal free default logic is that it induces a cumulative consequence operation. The fact that the consequence operation induced by unrestricted default logic is not cumulative has been considered a drawback of default logic, and several authors have looked at ways to modify default logic to make its consequence operation cumulative. In the following section, we argue that an prioritized version of normal free default logic can be interpreted as a logic for defeasible observations.
Observation Logic
Consider a robot making an observation. In order to (symbolically) reason with the observation, the subsymbolic information acquired by the sensors has to be translated into a symbolic language. We assume that the observation systems of the robot translate the raw sensory data into propositions expressed in a rst-order language L. Each observation is based on evidence which is limited in range and resolution, and which is therefore only directly related to (part of) an approximation of reality. An observation induces an expectation that what is observed will also hold for more re ned approximations, but this expectation can be defeated by observations based on more re ned evidence.
Let e denote the observation that based on evidence e. We can interpret this, analogous to the rendition of perception reports in 5], as being true given the approximation of reality induced by e plus a defeasible expectation that will also be true in more re ned approximations, including reality itself. For example, assume we have the observations e and e 0 , where and are incompatible (given the a priori knowledge) and e 0 is more re ned than e. Then the expectation induced by e is defeated by e 0 .
The (defeasible) expectation accompanying the observation e intuitively seems to imply the (normal) default rules e : e 0 = e 0 , for each e 0 that is more re ned than e. Since these default rules are only added to the theory when also the prerequisite e is added, one can use the normal free default rules > : e 0 = e 0 instead. In the case of the observations e and e 0 , where and are incompatible and e 0 is more re ned than e, it then is clear that the expectation of e is blocked by the truth of at the approximation of reality induced by e 0 .
If we abstract in our formal language from the evidence on which the observation is based, then an observation can simply be modelled as a normal free default rule > :
To properly capture the interaction of di erent observations, one can mirror the relation between the underlying bodies of evidence in an ordering on the corresponding default rules. The assumption of < being well-founded is necessary for the de nitions of extension given below. The assumption (essentially the same as stopperedness of 6] and smoothness of 4]) seems not too restricitive for our purpose, since it is automatically satis ed if D is nite, and at any time a robot can have made only a nite number of observations. We rst repeat from 2] the general de nition of an extension of a prioritized default logic using a well-ordering compatible with <. De nition 11 Let hD; ?; <i be a prioritized default theory. The set E is called an <-compatible extension of hD; ?; <i i E is an extension of hD; ?i generated by a well-ordering compatible with <.
Intuitively, an extension of hD; ?i generated by a well-ordering is obtained by sequentially applying, starting from T h(?), the -minimal default rule among the non-applied applicable default rules of D. (See 2, 7] for details.) By choosing a wellordering compatible with <, the stronger defaults (with higher priorities) are applied rst, thereby making weaker incompatible defaults non-applicable.
Example 2 Consider the observations p e and q e 0 , and assume that it is a priori known that p and q are incompatible, i.e., :(p^q). Further assume that e 0 is more rened evidence than e. This situation is modelled by the observation theory D consisting of the default theory hf> : p=p; > : q=qg; f:(p^q)gi with priority > : q=q < > : p=p. The unique extension of D is T h(f:p; qg). Without the priority, both T h(f:p; qg) and T h(f:q; pg) would have been extensions.
To make the example more concrete, suppose that p e denotes a robot's observation, based on some sonar readings, that a particular door is closed, and that q e 0 denotes the observation, based on a videocamera image in addition to the previously mentioned sonar readings, that the door is open. Then the robot should of course conclude that the door is open.
In the above example, the same conclusion is warranted if the evidence e 0 is just stronger or more reliable than e, rather than more re ned. However, as we will illustrate later on, these di erent interpretations of the orderings can result in di erent conclusions in more complex examples.
On can imagine that having di erent interpretations of the ordering between default rules results in having di erent de nitions of extensions of a prioritized default theory. In fact, the above standard de nition of <-compatible extension will not be used as our notion of extension for observation theories.
Before we discuss which notion of extension we regard as appropriate for our purpose, let us consider an alternative way of obtaining extensions of prioritized default theories, namely by rst computing an (ordinary default) extension using only the (unordered) default rules with maximal priority, and subsequently computing an extension using the default rules of the next priority level, et cetera. For observation theories this can be made more precise as follows.
De nition 12 Let The order between other pairs of <-incomparable default rules can be chosen arbitrarily. Then E is an extension of hD; ?i generated by , and since is compatible with <, E is a <-compatible extension of D.
The following example shows that the reverse of this proposition is not true.
Example 3 Consider the observations p e , q e 0 and r e 00 , and assume that it is a priori known that p; q and r are jointly incompatible, i.e., :(p^q^r). Further assume that e 0 is more re ned evidence than e (and e 00 is incomparable to the other bodies of evidence).
This situation is modelled by the observation theory D consisting of the default theory hf> : p=p; > : q=q; > : r=rg; f:(p^q^r)gi with priority > : q=q < > : p=p. The unique layered extension of D is T h(f:p; q; rg). However, both T h(f:p; q; rg) and T h(fp; q; :rg) are <-compatible extensions.
The following example indicates a problem with both layered extension and <-compatible extensions in case d < d 0 is interpreted to mean that default rule d is based on more re ned evidence than d 0 .
Example 4 Consider the observations p e , q e 0 and r e 00 , and assume that it is a priori known that q is incompatible both with p and with r, i.e., :(p^q) and :(r^q). Further assume that e 00 is more re ned evidence than e 0 and e 0 is more re ned evidence than e. This situation is modelled by the observation theory D consisting of the default theory hf> : p=p; > : q=q; > : r=rg; f(:(p^q))^(:(r^q))gi with priority > : r=r < > : q=q < > : p=p. This theory has one <-compatible extension T h(fp; :q; rg) and this extension is also layered.
To make the example more concrete, consider a robot in the process of nding out whether a particular door is open. Let us say that the door has to be open at least 70 degrees to be called open, since otherwise the robot cannot safely pass the door. Suppose that p e denotes the robot's observation, based on some videocamera image taken from considerable distance from the door, that the door is 84 degrees open, that q e 0 denotes the observation based on some sonar readings in addition to the videocamera image, that the door is closed, and that r e 00 denotes the observation, based in addition to the previously mentioned sensor information on a videocamera image taken at close proximity to the door, that the door is open (without being able to specify the exact angle of the door). Then both <-compatible and layered extensions allow the conclusion that the door is 84 degrees open.
The problem with this conclusion is that the observation p e is defeated by q e 0 , and it is not clear whether the fact that q e 0 is in turn defeated by r e 00 justi es re-establishing the conclusions based on p e . In fact, if e 00 is more re ned than e, then the information supporting p in the rst observation is also present in e 00 . Therefore, if one assumes that r is the most speci c proposition (relative to the background knowledge) supported by the observation r e 00 , then p should not be derivable.
It is important to note that in the above example we introduced the assumption that the proposition mentioned in the observation is the most speci c proposition (relative to the bacground knowledge) that is justi ed given the evidence on which the observation is based. This assumption and its relation to the treatment of the problem of sensor fusion will be discussed in more detail in section 6.
Given the above assumption, it is natural to consider only the default rules in the top layer of the ordering, and propose 1-extensions (as de ned in de nition 12) as the appropriate extensions of an observation theory. Of course, any 1-extension of an observation theory hD; ?; <i is equivalent to an (ordinary Reiter) extension of the normal free default theory hD 1 ; ?i, where D 1 is the set of <-minimal default rules of D, as de ned in de nition 12.
At rst sight, one might think that, by the semi-monotonicity of normal default logic (see proposition 4), the resulting logic will have a monotonic behaviour. However, this is prevented by the ordering on defaults, since adding an observation does not necessarily result in a monotonic increase in the <-minimal default rules.
Example 5 Consider the situation of example 4. The observation theory D consisting of the default theory hf> : p=p; > : q=q; > : r=rg; f(:(p^q))^(:(r^q))gi with priority > : r=r < > : q=q < > : p=p has a unique 1-extension, namely T h(fr; :qg). If we consider the situation without the observation modelled by > : r=r, then the resulting observation theory has the unique 1-extension T h(f:p; q; :rg). That is, without the evidence of the videocamera at close proximity to the door, the conclusion that the door is closed would be justi ed.
In fact, the logic obtained by considering 1-extensions of observation theories is an interesting nonmonotonic formalism, in which it is for example possible to`withdraw' an observation p e (where p cannot be deduced from the background knowledge) by adding the observation > e 0 with e 0 more re ned than e. (More generally, any e 0 , where together with the background knowledge does not imply p and e 0 more re ned than e has a similar e ect.) However, since the assumption underlying the choice for 1-extensions may not be appropriate in all circumstances, we propose in the next section a rather general semantics for observation theories that allows us to consider di erent variants of observation logic next to the logic induced by 1-extensions.
Semantics
An observation theory hD; ?; <i is called consistent i ? is consistent. Unless stated otherwise, we will from now on assume that observation theories are consistent, and moreover, we will assume that for any observation theory hD; ?; <i the facts ? are consistent with every consequent of a default rule d 2 D. These assumptions are in accordance with our treatment of ? as`hard' background knowledge.
As models of observation theories we essentially use directed sets of rst-order models, where the ordering between the rst-order models representing the observations re ects the (re nement) ordering of (the evidence underlying) the observations. As a reminder we include the de nition of a directed set.
De nition 13 Let be a partial order on the set X. Then hX; i is called a directed Observation models where the satisfaction relation is thus extended are called straight. More generally, observation models where the satisfaction relation is (in some way) extended to include default rules are called extended.
An observation model is not a classical rst-order model. In fact, an observation model plays a role which is roughly similar to a possible worlds, or Kripke, model in modal epistemic logic, namely as a model of an agent's belief set such that the agent's belief set corresponds to the set of formulas valid in all its models. More precisely, an observation model of an observation theory models the beliefs of an agent who believes all the facts and a subset of the conclusions of the default rules present in the observation theory. Since we consider agents who, by default, believe the observations, we will be interested in observation models which maximize the set of valid default conclusions, or rather, the set of applied or valid default rules.
Notice that the second condition of de nition 14 involves a change in direction of the orderings. We feel this is appropriate, since the ordering on the models should be viewed as an information ordering. The intuitive reading of M 0 > M is that M 0 is more re ned than M. Notice however, that we have not implemented a formal notion of re nement as in the inverse re ning systems of models of 5]. An (information) ordering between models mirroring the preference relation < between default rules will be called an information image of <. It is clear that there are two kinds of observation models. An observation model hM; ; obsi either has a top, i.e., a model M > 2 M which is more re ned than any other element of M, or M contains for any of its elements an in nite sequent of re nements. In the latter case, we call the observation model top-less. These topless observation models are more like the re ning inverse systems of models of 5] than the observation models with a top are. In 5], each rst-order model in the re ning system is viewed as an approximation to reality which itself is assumed to be in nitely precise and to re ne each of the models in the re ning system. However, in an observation model the top (or any other element) does not represent the reality (or an approximation of it) but (a partial description of) a world considered possible by the observing agent. It is easy to see that in de nition 14 we could have restricted ourselves to topless observation models, since any observation model is equivalent to a top-less one. (Just add an in nite sequence of copies of the top-element on top of the top-element.) However, below we will consider observation models where the satisfaction of default rules is de ned di erently than for the straight observation models of de nition 14, and for some of these variants it does make a di erence whether observation models have a top or not.
The directedness condition ensures that default rules interact in the sense that a set of incompatible default rules cannot be satis ed in an observation model. As mentioned before, the most interesting observation models are those in which the set of valid default rules are maximized. In accordance with tradition, we will call these observation models minimal.
De nition 16 Let Analogous to the proof of lemma 9 it can be shown that the class of one level observation models of an observation theory is regular. More importantly, there is an exact correspondence between minimal one level observation models of an observation theory and its 1-extensions. Since the notion of satisfying a default rule is more straightforward in the case of straight observation models than in the case of one level observation models, it is interesting to determine the kind of extensions corresponding with minimal straight observation models. The di erence between 1-extensions and unblocked extensions is that in the rst case, an observation is assumed to defeat all observations based on less re ned evidence, whereas in the latter case, observations that are not based on maximally re ned evidence can still play a role (as long as they are not blocked by some incompatible observation based on more re ned evidence).
Proof. Assume M is a straight observation model of D = hD; ?; <i. We will rst show that T h(? CONSEQ(M(D))) T h( M] D ). Suppose 2 T h(? CONSEQ(M(D))). Then 2 T h( ), for some nite subset of ? CONSEQ(M(D)
Example 6 Consider the situation of example 4, but without the second observation q e 0 . That is, we have the observations p e and r e 00 , where e 00 is more re ned evidence than e. This situation is modelled by the observation theory D consisting of the default theory hf> : p=p; > : r=rg; ;i with priority > : r=r < > : p=p. This theory has one one level extension T h(frg) and one unblocked extension T h(fp; rg).
In the concrete interpretation of a robot in the process of nding out whether a particular door is open, p e denotes the robot's observation, based on some videocamera image taken from considerable distance from the door, that the door is 84 degrees open, and r e 00 denotes the observation, additionally based on a videocamera image taken at close proximity to the door, that the door is open (without being able to specify the exact angle of the door). In that case, the one level extension only allows the conclusion that the door is open (without being able to specify the exact angle), whereas the unblocked extension allows the more speci c conclusion that the door is 84 degrees open.
The above example provides another illustration of our previously mentioned opinion that one level extensions are only appropriate under the assumption that observations mention the most speci c proposition. If one uses unblocked extensions, one does not need this assumption, but it is not exactly clear how to justify the fact that an observation that itself is defeated can still defeat some observations. (In the original situation of example 4, the observation q e 0 blocks p e , although q e 0 is defeated by the observation r e 00 . Thus the unique unblocked extension coincides with the one level extension T h(frg). ) If one believes that observations should not be blocked by defeated observations, then one should not use unblocked extensions. In that case, <-compatible extensions seem to be an obvious choice. In order to obtain a semantics for <-compatible exten- A rst idea is to allow a nite number of exceptions (i.e., models > obs(d) not satisfying the consequent of d) in the satisfaction clause for default rules. This does not work, since a nite extended observation model of hD; ?; <i would then satisfy all default rules of D. Thus the minimal extended observation models would satisfy all the default rules, whether the rules are compatible or not. It is immediate that, in general, the class of the thus obtained extended observation models of an observation theory would not be regular.
Even if we restrict ourselves to top-less observation models, we do not obtain a semantics for <-compatible extensions, since the e ect of the ordering is completely lost as soon as a nite number of exceptions is allowed in the satisfaction clause for default rules. In fact, in that case, we get a semantics for the underlying default theory, without the priorities.
De nition 21 Let It can be shown that the class of co nal observation models of an observation theory is regular. (The proof of lemma 9 has to be slightly amended, since after adding a top to a co nal model it is no longer top-less, and therefore no longer co nal. The problem with this approach is that the satisfaction and defeat of default rules interact in intricate ways, since the more default rules are satis ed, the more default rules are defeated, and vice versa. Therefore, it is not immediately clear what the correct de nition of defeat would have to be. A simple solution is to introduce in the extended observation models an additional parameter for a particular well-ordering compatible with the partial order < on default rules. Notice that in the above de nition the notions of satisfaction and defeat of default rules are well de ned since their respective clauses only refer to other default rules that are more preferred according to . Analogous to the proof of lemma 9 it can be shown that the class of <-compatible observation models of an observation theory is regular.
Proposition 13 D) )) is a <-compatible extension of D. By the regularity of <-compatible observation models, it then follows that E is a <-compatible extension of D.
We conclude that the proposed observation models can provide a exible semantics for di erent observation logics. In the following section we discuss in more detail the matter under what circumstances the di erent observation logics are most appropriate, and we relate this matter to the much discussed problem of sensor fusion in robotics.
The Sensor Fusion Problem
Evidence from one particular, isolated sensor reading is relatively well understood. One usually has at least su cient partial or approximate knowledge of the behaviour, and in particular of the reliability, of a sensor to con dently relate possible sensor readings to conclusions about the state of the world. Unfortunately, since sensors are never completely reliable and often quite unreliable, these conclusions are typically fairly weak. Therefore, multiple sensor readings need to be combined in order to justify strong conclusions.
The problem with combining, or fusing, the evidence obtained from multiple sensor readings is that it is di cult to assess the interaction between multiple pieces of evidence acquired from di erent sensors, from di erent readings of the same sensor obtained at di erent locations, or even from readings of the same sensor obtained at the same location.
Typically, one uses some numeric uncertainty formalism, such as probability theory, which allows the reinforcement of conclusions whenever sensor readings agree and (partial) cancelling out of the individual e ects of disagreeing sensor readings. This probabilistic, or in general numeric, reasoning is very powerful, but it requires a lot of data or strong assumptions. Since often the required data is insu ciently available and the chosen assumptions cannot adequately be justi ed, the conclusions obtained by numeric reasoning cannot always be trusted.
Since we use non-numeric default rules to represent observations, we cannot expect the same subtle reasoning. But default reasoning still may give reasonable and useful results, and, in particular in situations where the numeric data required for numeric reasoning cannot easily be obtained, the results of default reasoning are not necessarily inferior to those of the numeric approaches.
Let us brie y comment on the relation between expressing an observation in terms of (normal free) default rules and the representation of an observation in numeric, say probabilistic, terms. At rst sight, it might seem reasonable to assume that a defeasible observation that , represented by > : = , has a roughly equivalent probabilistic interpretation of the form that, given the evidence, is the most likely, or most probable, possibility. The problem with this assumption is t hat either the most likely possibility is trivially >, or one has to compare only possibilities corresponding to elementary events or, more generally, possibilities corresponding to some partition of the sample space, and it is di cult to x in advance an appropriate partition. An alternative probabilistic interpretation of the default rule > : = representing a defeasible observation is to say that it is roughly equivalent to saying that, given the evidence, the probability of is su ciently high. It is well known that, unless su ciently high is interpreted as arbitrarily close to 1, both interpretations support di erent sets of inference rules. For example, whenever and are compatible, > : = and > : = together support ^ , whereas in the probabilistic interpretation this inference is not valid, since the probability of the conjunction ^ may be signi cantly lower than the probabilities of the individual conjuncts.
In spite of the fact that no exact agreement exists between the conclusion supported by default rules and those supported by the above mentioned probabilistic interpretation of default rules, we still think the interpretation is at least useful as a heuristic. For example, the fact that evidence that does not support a rather speci c proposition (such as`the door is 84 degrees open') can still support a less speci c proposition (such as`the door is open') is quite clear under the probabilistic interpretation.
For an adequate evaluation of the usefulness of the interpretation of observations by means of default rules, it is important to know how multiple observations are combined. To get an overview of how the choice for a particular notion of extension e ect the combination behaviour, we summarize in table 1 the conclusions supported by the di erent defeasible observation logics in several examples.
It is easy to see that the conclusions supported by 1-extensions are included in the set of conclusions supported by layered extensions, since for every layered extension E of an observation theory D there exists an 1-extension E 0 of D such that E 0 E. It follows from the examples summarized in table 1 that, in general, the set of conclusions supported by 1-extensions is not necessarily weaker (or stronger) than the set of conclusions supported by <-compatible, unblocked, or unprioritized extensions.
In example 6, all the discussed types of extensions, except the 1-extensions, support the conclusion that the door is 84 degrees open. As mentioned before, this strong conclusion is no longer justi ed if the observation that the door is open is assumed to be based on evidence which is really more re ned than (and therefore includes) the evidence underlying the observation that the door is 84 degrees open, and if one additionally assumes that`the door is open' is the most speci c conclusion supported great distance) , that the door is closed (sonar), and that the door is open (videocamera, small distance). Example 6 is the same, but without the sonarbased observation that the door is closed. In the new example, we add to example 6 a new observation that the door is 79 degrees open, and we assume that this observation is incomparable to both other observations. by the more re ned evidence.
Assuming that the evidence e underlying the observation that the door is open is more re ned than the evidence e 0 underlying the observation that the door is 84 degrees open implies that e does not consist only of the videocamera image taken near the door, but also incorporates the videocamera image taken from considerable distance (e 0 ). In other words, more re ned evidence combines the less re ned evidence (possibly) with new sensory information.
Although usually the evidence from one particular observation or sensor reading is better understood than the combined e ect of several observations, it is also sometimes the case that in order to express a particular observation in an abstract, symbolic language, one has to take into account several other observations. For example, when interpreting a videocamera image and concluding from it that the door is open, one typically uses information obtained by other sensor readings about matters like the approximate distance between the camera and the door. Therefore, even if at one level of description sensor readings are initially interpreted in isolation, it may be the case that at some more abstract level, observations often re ne other (previous) observations.
The pieces of evidence underlying incomparable (maximally preferred) observations can be viewed as pieces of evidence that (as yet) have not been combined, and the defeasible observation logic using 1-extensions can be viewed as a logic providing (defeasible) statements of what the results of the combination of these pieces of evidence are expected to be. In fact the process of combining two observations e and e 0 can be represented by adding an observation based on evidence re ning both e and e 0 . Since it is not necessary for this latter observation to incorporate some new sensory information, one might consider the sensor fusion process itself as a kind of observation'.
It should be noted that, although we have used the sceptical, or cautious, interpretation of default consequence, it is not the case that the expectations concerning the results of combining evidence as expressed by the observation logic using 1-extensions are the weakest possible, or most cautious.
Example 8 Consider two observations e and e 0 , where denotes that the door is 84 degrees open and denotes that the door is 79 degrees open, and where e and e 0 are incomparable. The observation logic using 1-extensions supports the conclusion that the door is 79 or 84 degrees open. However, after proper combination of e and e 0 it might be the case that both pieces of evidence are considered unreliable, and it might even become unclear whether the pieces of evidence provide any information concerning the state of the door at all.
We conclude that reasoning with the observation logic using 1-extensions should not replace a careful sensor fusion process. However, as long as the defeasible conclusions of the observation logic are recognized as defeasible expectations, they form a potentially useful supplement to the conclusions based on the (at any particular time, probably incomplete) process of careful combination of obtained evidence.
Using <-compatible, unblocked, and layered extensions does not seem compatible with a reading of < as a re ning relation. In that case, < is more naturally interpeted as a relation expressing relative strength or reliability of pieces of evidence. The observation logics using these di erent notions of extensions implement di erent intuitions concerning the issue of how to combine observations, but they all, in a sense, replace a careful sensor fusion process, rather than supplement it.
However, since we believe that, in general, a careful combination of the observations cannot adequately be represented, or even approximated, by a systematic interaction between the default rules representing the observations, we prefer 1-extensions above the other mentioned notions of extension.
The Multiple Extension Problem
The standard explanation of the meaning of a normal, free default rule > : !=! allows the derivation of !, provided ! is consistent with what is derivable. Assuming that an extension is intended to represent a reasonable set of conclusions of the default theory, the existence of multiple extensions constitutes a problem, since any choice for a particular extension is arbitrary in the sense that it does not follow from the (default) theory.
The problem does not disappear in case the intersection of all extensions is proposed to be the set of conclusions of a default theory. The di culty with this cautious or sceptical approach is that in general the intersection is itself not an extension and not closed under the default rules.
Example 9 Consider the default theory consisting of the two default rules > : p=p and > : q=q and background knowledge :(p^q). This default theory has two extensions: T h(fp; :qg) and T h(f:p; qg). The intersection of the extensions is T h(fp $ qg). If this intersection is supposed to be the set of all derivable conclusions, then, under the standard interpretation of default rules, > : p=p is applicable, and p is derivable. In the same way, > : q=q allows the derivation of q. But T h(fp $ qg) contains neither p nor q.
A possible solution of the problem is to come up with an alternative interpretation of default rules, where the justi cation does not refer to the set of derivable conclusions. When default rules are used to represent defeasible observations, such an alternative interpretation is actually rather natural.
An observation e is a reason to conclude that , and this reason is su cient, unless other (incomparable or more re ned) observations provide reasons against . If these other observations are based on more re ned evidence than e, then the observation e is defeated. If the other observations are incomparable to e , then the supported conclusion is weaker than , but should still be considered possible. Thus, the default rule > : = representing e supports the conclusion only in case all evidence against is less re ned than e.
Given the interpretation of a (normal, free) default rule as a (not necessarily su cient) reason to conclude the consequent of the rule, the sceptical approach to default logic seems quite sensible. In the sceptical approach, extensions should not be interpreted as reasonable sets of conclusions of a default theory, but as maximally consistent sets of conclusions, mirroring the interaction between the default rules.
For example, the intersection T h(fp $ qg) of the extensions T h(fp; :qg) and T h(f:p; qg) seems to be a reasonable set of conclusion in case of example 9. The fact that there is a reason for believing p and a reason for believing q is compatible with this set of conclusions, since the reasons are only considered su cient for actually drawing the conclusions in case all con icting evidence is less re ned.
If default rules are used to represent defeasible observation, then there is a second solution to the multiple extension problem. Since multiple extensions only occur in the presence of con icting default rules, one can simply avoid the formalization of con icting observations. For example, one can apply a process of sensor fusion to harmonize con icting observations, before translating the observation into default rules. The resulting observation logic will have a unique extension.
In the context of 1-extensions, it is always possible to`weaken' several con icting observations to their disjunction. For example, p e and q e 0 , with p and q incompatible and e and e 0 incomparable, can be replaced by (p _ q) e 00 , with e 00 more re ned than e and e 0 . This can be viewed as a particular method of combining (possibly con icting) observations, but the conclusions resulting from harmonizing con icting observations with this particular method of sensor fusion are in general weaker than the conclusions supported by taking the intersection of all 1-extensions of the original observation theory.
Example 10 Consider the default theory consisting of the three default rules > : p=p, > : q=q, > : r=r, and background knowledge :(p^q^r). This default theory has three extensions: T h(fp; q; :rg), T h(fp; :q; rg), and T h(f:p; q; rg). Each of these extensions contains the formula :p ! (q^r), but this formula is not contained in T h(f:(p^q^r); p _q _rg), which is the unique 1-extension of the observation theory obtained from the original default theory by adding a default rule > : p _q _r=p_q_r re ning the original three default rules.
One can of course try to represent other, perhaps more complex, sensor fusion methods in observation logic, but we will not pursue this matter here.
Conclusions
We have shown how defeasible observations can be formalized using prioritized normal free default logic, i.e., observation logic. Several notions of extension for this special case of default logic have been discussed, and it has been argued that the notion of 1-extension is the most appropriate, provided the priority relation is assumed to be a re ning relation, and the formula mentioned in an observation statement is maximally speci c, or informative.
The proposed semantics for observation logic is loosely based on the re ning systems for the logic of vision presented in 5], and is su ciently general to cover several variants of observation logic induced by various notions of extension. The di erence between 1-extensions and the other notions is caused by a di erence in the way the satisfaction relation of an observation model is extended to include default rules.
We argued that the observation logic induced by 1-extensions cannot replace a careful sensor fusion process, but that it can supplement sensor fusion by giving some statements of the expected combined e ect of observations before the underlying pieces of evidence are actually combined in a careful (but di cult) sensor fusion process.
Finally, we claim that the existence of multiple extensions of an observation theory does not consitute a problem for observation logic, since the default rules represent-ing defeasible observations have a natural interpretation where the justi cation of a default rule does not refer to the set of conclusions of the observation theory.
